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Abstract 
We model a standard competitive labour market where firms choose combinations of 
workers and hours per worker to produce output.  If one assumes that the scale of 
production  has no impact on hours per worker, then the change in the number of 
workers and hours per worker resulting from a minimum wage are inversely related.  
We also demonstrate that total hours worked at the firm may rise if there are small 
fixed costs to hiring workers. 
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1 We are grateful to John Kennan and participants at seminars in U.C.D and Trinity College Dublin for 
comments.   2 
Section I: Introduction 
Evidence from minimum wage studies h ave frequently been used to assess 
whether labour markets are well approximated by the competitive model, which 
would predict that a minimum wage would have a negative impact on employment, or 
by alternative models such as the monopsony model, which posits a positve 
relationship
2. For example, Neumark and Wascher (2007) note in their review of the 
empirical l iterature:  “ .. we hope our review will help readers assess alternative 
models of the labour market” (p.5).
3  However, even  Neumark and  Wascher are 
careful to stress the limitations of the theoretical predictions noting that “...even in the 
neoclassical model, the effect of the minimum wage on any given set of workers will 
depend on, among other things, the elasticities of substitution across different types of 
workers and cross elasticities of demand across different types of goods.”   
In this paper we argue that in fact the results of  empirical  research on the 
employment effects of minimum wages have little to say in terms of providing 
evidence for competing models of the labour market.   To demonstrate this we 
examine the predictions of the standard theoretical model where firms choose the 
number of workers and hours per worker
4.  Our results show that the impact of 
minimum wages on hours per worker, the number of workers, and total hours worked 
are indeed ambiguous.  Our results are based on a partial equilibrium models where 
firms choose one type of worker and are not driven by general equilibrium effects or 
uncertainty about how the firm will substitute across different types of workers. 
                                                 
2 Strobl and Walsh (2007) look at the impact of minimum wage on employment and hours in a 
monopsony model. 
3 Neumark and Wascher in their introduction and throughout chapter 3.2 document several studies that 
suggest the sign of the employment effect from a minimum wage is evidence for these competing 
models. 
4 While there exists an abundance of studies empirically estimating the employment effects of the 
minimum wage [see Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a survey], this literature often estimates changes 
in the number of employees or sometimes the number of full-time equivalents.  Moreover, the 
empirical evidence with regard to the effect of a minimum wage on hours per worker is rather mixed; 
see, for instance, Katz and Kruger (1992),  Brown (1999), Zavodney (2000), and Gregory (2002).   3 
Section II: The Model 
The theoretical treatment of minimum wages  in the literature when firms 
choose a combination of hours per worker and workers is rather limited.
5 In this paper 
we apply a minimum wage to Kinoshita’s (1987) model.
6  
Firms are assumed to be able to hire as many workers as they wish at any hour 
(h), so that hourly wage (w) combination is on the equilibrium locus w(h).  The firm’s 
profit function is: 
  (,)[,()]() nhpfnhwwhwnkn P=--   (1.1) 
The output price p is given to the firm and the production function 
(,) qfhn = satisfies 0 > n f , 0 > h f , 0 < nn f , 0 < hh f , where h is hours per worker , n is 
the number of workers and q is output  There are fixed costs k per worker.  The firm’s 
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One can assess the impact of a minimum wage on the number of workers by totally 
differentiating the first order condition on n.  Evaluating this differential at the initial 














  (1.3) 
 
                                                 
5 Hamermesh (1993) develops a framework that deals with the firm’s choice of workers and hours in a 
cost minimisation framework and includes a brief discussion of minimum wages, while Michl (2000) 
outlines a model where firms choose workers and hours and the wage does not increase with hours.  
Other studies, such as Stewart and Swaffield (2006), Zavodney (2000), Neumark and Schweitzer 
(2000), and Connolly and Gregory (2002) only contain general discussions on how mimimum wages 
are related to hours. 
6 Kinoshita derives the equilibrium properties of the compensating differentials model applied to hours 
work.  The models of Lewis (1969) and Rosen (1986) are the precursors to this model.   4 
  Next we assume that the scale of production does not affect the optimal choice 
of hours per worker, other things equal. Hamermesh (1993) p50 notes, for example, 
that “...there is no evidence that weekly hours of full-time workers at General Motors 
differ substantially from hours of workers at the local steel fabricator”(p.50).  If this 
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If the hourly wage - hours per worker locus has a positive (negative) slope we expect 
firms to use the minimum wage to increase (decrease) hours per worker and decrease 
(increase) the number of workers at a given level of output.  A puzzling implication of 
(1.4) is that since much of the existing empirical evidence suggests a decline in hours 
from a minimum wage
8, then (1.4) suggests that affected firms decrease hours and 
increase the number of workers.  This implies that workers are on a negatively sloped 
hourly wage, hours locus.  There is no reason that this should not be so in the theory, 
but one may suspect that many economists would expect the contrary.  For example 
Hamermesh (1993) assumes the equilibrium locus has a positive slope in his treatment 
of the theory of hours per workers, while Michl (2000) assumes the locus is flat.  In 
any case equation (1.4) should make us reluctant to conclude that one can infer 
whether the labour market is competitive or not by looking at the results of studies 
that focus on the number of workers, as much of the literature does since theory has 
                                                 
7 In fact the assumption need only be true for a small deviation from equilibrium output for the analysis 
to go through.  Many of the most commonly used functional forms used for the labour aggregator such 
as the class of functions  (,)() fnhAnxh
a =  satisfy this assumption.  A and a are positive constants 
and x(h) is a positive function 
8 See the review by Neumark and Wascher (2007) or Brown (1999).   5 
no clear prediction on the change in hours per worker and predicts an offsetting 
change in the number of workers.
9   
While it has been pointed out in the literature that when one accounts for the 
possibility that hours per worker may fall in response to a minimum wage, this may 
be associated with an increase in the number of workers, even in the competitive 
model, the general belief is that total hours cannot increase.  As Neumark and 
Wascher (2007) p166 note “..although much of the literature has focused on the 
employment effects of the minimum wage, the predictions of theory tend to be about 
overall labour input rather than employment specifically.. (p.166)”.  The empirical 
studies that do try and estimate the impact on the overall labour input generally focus 
on total hours
10.  
We define the elasticity of output with respect to workers (n) and hours per 








e = .  It follows from the first order 
















  (1.5)  
If one thinks of employment as total hours (nh), then using (1.4) and (1.5) the 






















  (1.6) 
The elasticity of total hours (nh) with respect to the wage is: 
                                                 
9 See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for examples.  Some studies do account for hours, Michl (2000) 
provides evidence and some theory to suggest that decreases in hours could explain the positive 
employment effects found in Card and Kruegers well known (1995)study of the New Jersey minimum 
wage increase.  
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>>   (1.8) 
  
One should note from (1.7) that when fixed costs (k) are equal to zero then , 1 nhw e =-  
and a minimum wage reduces total hours proportionately.  However (1.8) also 
indicates that when  qnqh ee > , if fixed costs as a fraction of the wage bill lie above a 
certain threshold then total hours will increase in response to a minimum wage
11.  
Also, one does not need extreme values for the parameters for total hours to increase.  
For example, when  qnqh ee >  but the elasticity of output with respect to workers and 
hours per worker are similar, the presence of small fixed costs will ensure a positive 
effect.   
We can establish the following proposition:
12 
 If  qnqh ee > a minimum wage will increase total hours worked if the hours per worker, 
hourly wage locus has a positive slope. 
Proof:  From (1.5) if the hourly wage locus has a positive slope the denominator of 
(1.7) is positive.  This implies that (1.7) is positive since qnqh ee > . 
 
                                                 
11 Feldstein (1967) and Michl (2000) amongst others explicitly assume  qnqh ee > .  
12 A maple file solving the model explicitly and showing the model is well behaved over parameter 
ranges where total hours increase, where there are representative workers and firms with Cobb-Douglas 
utility and production functions is excluded because of space limitations but is available from the 
authors.   7 
Section III: Conclusion 
The idea that minimum wages may lead to offsetting effects on hours per 
worker is  generally recognised in the literature. However, given the prevalence of 
studies that focus solely on the number of workers and the willingness to make 
inferences on the underlying labour market from the results, we suspect that the fact 
that changes in hours per workers and the number of workers from a minimum wage 
can be either positive or negative and will typically be inversely related in a simple 
partial equilibrium competitive labour market is not yet well understood. In addition, 
the result that total hours may increase in response to a minimum wage when firms 
have even  small fixed costs, should  make researchers  wary about using empirical 
studies of minimum wages on employment to make inferences on the nature of the 
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Condition for scale effect on hours to equal zero 
We minimise cost subject to the constraint that a given level of output q is produced 
using the lagrangean ? .  The labour aggregator f(h,n) turns combinations of workers 
(n) and hours per worker (h) into an amount (q) of output.  The equilibrium hourly 
wage hours worked locus is: w(h). A fixed cost k must be Paid per worker hired
13. 
  (){[,()]} whwnnkqfnwh il =++-   (1.9) 

















  (1.10) 
                                                 
13 We  let the firm choose the level of hours here, which depends on the wage, rather than choose the 
wage which depends on hours as in the text.  This makes no difference to the analysis but for 
exposition purposes it may be a little clearer to illustrate the scale affect when the firm chooses hours 
and to illustrate the minimum wage affect when the firm chooses the wage.   9 
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